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Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing

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Abstract

Market makers choose and design market rules to serve certain objectives, such as to maximize revenue from the sales in the case of a single seller and multiple buyers. Given such rules, market participants play against each other to maximize their utility function values on goods acquired, possibly by hiding or misrepresenting their information needed in the implementation of market rules. Today’s Internet economy has changed the information collection process and may make some of the assumptions of market rule implementation obsolete. Here we make a fresh review of works on this challenge on the Internet where new economic systems operate.

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Funding

The funding agencies supporting our research are acknowledged.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Suzhou Key Laboratory for Big Data and Information Service, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, 215009, China

    Yukun Cheng

  2. School of EECS, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China

    Xiaotie Deng

  3. Department of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, 200240, China

    Dominik Scheder

Authors
  1. Yukun Cheng
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  2. Xiaotie Deng
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  3. Dominik Scheder
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xiaotie Deng.

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This is a theoretical research therefore there is no human nor animal subjects is involved.

Conflicts of interest

There is no conflict of interest to any other work.

Additional information

This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61632017, 61761146005, 71771161, 71471091). Dominik Scheder acknowledges support by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61502300.

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Cheng, Y., Deng, X. & Scheder, D. Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing. 4OR-Q J Oper Res 16, 231–260 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10288-018-0385-3

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