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Competition and Cooperation in Non-Centralized Linear Production Games

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze how to improve the benefits of n producers when: (1) each producer i faces a linear production problem given by max {c i x i:A i x i≤ b i,x i 0}, and (2) maintaining the production capabilities of each producer is mandatory. In order to maximize the benefits, the producers decide to trade their resources while ensuring their initial individual gains. We study the games which describe this non-centralized linear production situation when players do not cooperate (section two), when players cooperate and side payments are possible (section three), and when players cooperate and side payments are not possible (section four).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Facultad de Matemáticas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012, Sevilla, Spain

    Francisco Ramón Fernández

  2. Facultade de Económicas, Universidade de Vigo, 36200, Vigo, Spain

    MarÍa Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro

  3. Facultade de Matemáticas, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 15782, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

    Ignacio GarcÍa-Jurado

  4. Dep. Estadistica e Investigacion Operative, Facultad de Matemáticas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012, Sevilla, Spain

    Justo Puerto

Authors
  1. Francisco Ramón Fernández
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  2. MarÍa Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
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  3. Ignacio GarcÍa-Jurado
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  4. Justo Puerto
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Francisco Ramón Fernández.

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Fernández, F.R., Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G., GarcÍa-Jurado, I. et al. Competition and Cooperation in Non-Centralized Linear Production Games. Ann Oper Res 137, 91–100 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2247-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2247-6

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