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Generalized Maximin Solutions in Multicriteria Bargaining

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Abstract

In this paper we address bargaining games where the agents have to take into account different criteria to value the decisions. We propose the class of generalized maximin solutions, as the natural extension for these games of the maximin solutions in conventional bargaining. In order to refine this solution concept, we define a multicriteria lexicographic partial ordering and present the class of generalized leximin solutions as those that are nondominated with respect to this relation. We establish some properties of these solutions and characterize them as solutions of multicriteria problems.

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Correspondence to A. M. Mármol.

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The research of the authors is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology projects BFM2002-11282-E and BEC2003-03111.

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Hinojosa, M.A., Mármol, A.M. & Monroy, L. Generalized Maximin Solutions in Multicriteria Bargaining. Ann Oper Res 137, 243–255 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2259-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2259-2

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