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A market-based multi-agent system model for decentralized multi-project scheduling

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Abstract

We consider a multi-project scheduling problem, where each project is composed of a set of activities, with precedence relations, requiring specific amounts of local and shared (among projects) resources. The aim is to complete all the project activities, satisfying precedence and resource constraints, and minimizing each project schedule length. The decision making process is supposed to be decentralized, with as many local decision makers as the projects. A multi-agent system model, and an iterative combinatorial auction mechanism for the agent coordination are proposed. We provide a dynamic programming formulation for the combinatorial auction problem, and heuristic algorithms for both the combinatorial auction and the bidding process. An experimental analysis on the whole multi-agent system model is discussed.

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Correspondence to Giuseppe Confessore.

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Confessore, G., Giordani, S. & Rismondo, S. A market-based multi-agent system model for decentralized multi-project scheduling. Ann Oper Res 150, 115–135 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-006-0158-9

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