Abstract
We consider the case when part of the uncertainty faced by a decision maker is derived from actions of another independent actor who pursues her own aims. Each party sets its decisions in the next time period in response to the other party's policy. We model this situation by introducing some ideas from game theory, but unlike this theory we do not focus on equilibrium and related optimality notions. Instead, we follow the framework of stochastic programming and take the view of one of the decision makers. Our model is placed in a telecommunication environment with a network owner and operators without their own network facilities. We give an extension to a multiperiod model.
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Audestad, JA., Gaivoronski, A.A. & Werner, A. Extending the stochastic programming framework for the modeling of several decision makers: pricing and competition in the telecommunication sector. Ann Oper Res 142, 19–39 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-006-6159-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-006-6159-x