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Efficient leakage-resilient public key encryption from DDH assumption

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Abstract

For an encryption scheme to be applied in practical applications, it should withstand various leakage attacks. In this paper, we present a new leakage-resilient public key encryption scheme whose security is based on the classical DDH (decisional Diffie-Hellman) assumption. In the computational cost, our proposed scheme is more efficient than the original Cramer-Shoup leakage-resilient public key encryption scheme. At the same time, our new scheme also enjoys a shorter (public and secret) key length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. We formally prove our new proposal is semantically secure against adaptive posteriori chosen ciphertext key-leakage attacks assuming the hardness of the DDH problem without random models.

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Acknowledgements

This research is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61170298), Natural Science Fund for Colleges and Universities in Jiangsu Province (No. 11KJB520006) and Young Teacher Fund of NJUT (No. 3970423). We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China

    Sujuan Li, Futai Zhang, Yinxia Sun & Limin Shen

  2. Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing, China

    Sujuan Li

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  1. Sujuan Li
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  2. Futai Zhang
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  4. Limin Shen
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Correspondence to Futai Zhang.

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Li, S., Zhang, F., Sun, Y. et al. Efficient leakage-resilient public key encryption from DDH assumption. Cluster Comput 16, 797–806 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-013-0253-z

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