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GreedEx—a scalable clearing mechanism for utility computing

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Abstract

Scheduling becomes key in dynamic and heterogeneous utility computing settings. Market-based scheduling offers to increase efficiency of the resource allocation and provides incentives to offer computer resources and services. Current market mechanisms, however, are inefficient and computationally intractable in large-scale settings.

The contribution of this paper is the proposal as well as analytical and numerical evaluation of GreedEx, an exchange for clearing utility computing markets, based on a greedy heuristic, that does achieve a distinct trade-off: GreedEx obtains fast and near-optimal resource allocations while generating prices that are truthful on the demand-side and approximately truthful on the supply-side.

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Correspondence to Jochen Stößer.

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Stößer, J., Neumann, D. GreedEx—a scalable clearing mechanism for utility computing. Electron Commer Res 8, 235–253 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-008-9023-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-008-9023-z

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