Abstract
In this paper, we introduce an internet voting protocol which satisfies desired security requirements of electronic voting. In the newly proposed protocol, we allow the adversaries to get more power than in any previous works. They can be coercers or vote buyers outside, and corrupted parties inside our system. These adversaries also have ability to collude with each other to ruin the whole system. Our main contribution is to design an internet voting protocol which is unsusceptible to most of sophisticated attacks. We employ the blind signature technique and the dynamic ballots instead of complex cryptographic techniques to preserve privacy in electronic voting. Moreover, we also aim at the practical system by improving the blind signature scheme and removing physical assumptions which have often been used in the previous works.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Acquisti, A. (2004). Receipt-free homomorphic elections and write-in voter verified ballots (ISRI Technical report CMU-ISRI-04-116). Carnegie Mellon University, PA.
Araújo, R., Rajeb, N.B., Robbana, R., Traoré, J., & Youssfi, S. (2010). Towards practical and secure coercion-resistant electronic election. In S. H. Heng, R. N. Wright, & B. M. Goi (Eds.), LNCS: Vol. 6467. Cryptology and network security (CANS 2010) (pp. 278–297). Heidelberg: Springer.
Baudron, O., Fouque, P. A., Pointcheval, D., Stern, J., & Poupard, G. (2001). Practical multi-candidate election system. In Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on principles of distributed computing (pp. 274–283). New York: ACM.
Bradford, P. G., Park, S., Rothkopf, M. H., & Park, H. (2008). Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions. Electronic Commerce Research, 8(1), 57–77.
Burmester, M., & Magkos, E. (2003). Towards secure and practical e-elections in the new era. In Secure electronic voting (Vol. 7, pp. 63–76).
Camenisch, J., & Lysyanskaya, A. (2005). A formal treatment of onion routing. In Advances in cryptology–CRYPTO 2005 (pp. 169–187). Berlin: Springer.
Cetinkaya, O., & Doganaksoy, A. (2006). A practical privacy preserving e-voting protocol using dynamic ballots. In Proceedings of the 2nd national cryptology symposium, Ankara, Turkey.
Cetinkaya, O., & Doganaksoy, A. (2007). A practical verifiable e-voting protocol for large scale elections over a network. In Proceedings of availability, reliability and security 2007 (ARES 2007), Vienna (pp. 432–442).
Chaum, D. (1981). Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2), 84–88.
Chaum, D. (1982). Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In Advances in cryptology: proceedings of crypto (Vol. 82, pp. 199–203).
Cramer, R., Gennaro, R., & Schoenmakers, B. (1997). A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. European Transactions on Telecommunications, 8(5), 481–490.
Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., & Ohta, K. (1993). A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In Advances in cryptology—AUSCRYPT’92 (pp. 244–251). Berlin: Springer.
Goldschlag, D., Reed, M., & Syverson, P. (1999). Onion routing for anonymous and private communications. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 39–41.
Hasan, M. S. (2008). E-voting scheme over Internet. In International conference on business and information, Seoul, South Korea.
Jakobsson, M., & Juels, A. (2000). Mix and match: secure function evaluation via ciphertexts. In Proceedings of the 6th international conference on the theory and application of cryptography and information security: advances in cryptography (pp. 162–177). London: Springer.
Juang, W. S., Lei, C. L., & Liaw, H. T. (2002). A verifiable multi-authority secret election allowing abstention from voting. Computer Journal, 45(6), 672–682.
Juels, A., Catalano, D., & Jakobsson, M. (2005). Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on privacy in the electronic society (pp. 61–70). New York: ACM.
Kohel, R. D. (2010). Public key cryptography. In Cryptography (pp. 67–74).
Liaw, H. T. (2004). A secure electronic voting protocol for general elections. Computers & Security, 23(2), 107–119.
Meng, B. (2009). A critical review of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. Information Technology Journal, 8(7), 934–964. ISSN 1812-5638
Nguyen, T. A. T., & Dang, T. K. (2011). Preserving privacy in electronic voting. In Proceedings of the 4th regional conference on information and communication technology, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (pp. 46–55).
Pagnoni, A., & Visconti, A. (2010). Secure electronic bills of lading: blind counts and digital signatures. Electronic Commerce Research, 10(3), 363–388.
Park, C., Itoh, K., & Kurosawa, K. (1994). Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme. In T. Helleseth (Ed.), LNCS: Vol. 765. Advances in cryptology EUROCRYPT’93 (pp. 248–259). Heidelberg: Springer.
Röhrig, S., & Knorr, K. (2004). Security analysis of electronic business processes. Electronic Commerce Research, 4(1), 59–81.
Smith, R., & Shao, J. (2007). Privacy and e-commerce: a consumer-centric perspective. Electronic Commerce Research, 7(2), 89–116.
Spycher, O., Koenig, R., Haenni, R., & Schläpfer, M. (2012). A new approach towards coercion-resistant remote e-voting in linear time. In G. Danezis (Ed.), LNCS: Vol. 7035. Financial cryptography and data security (FC 2011) (pp. 182–189). Heidelberg: Springer.
Srivastava, A. (2011). Resistance to change: six reasons why businesses don’t use e-signatures. Electronic Commerce Research, 11(4), 357–382.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Nguyen, T.A.T., Dang, T.K. Enhanced security in internet voting protocol using blind signature and dynamic ballots. Electron Commer Res 13, 257–272 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-013-9120-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-013-9120-5