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The AR glasses’ “non-neutrality”: their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of the object

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Abstract

This work focuses on augmented reality glasses and its aim is to analyse the knock-on effects on our everyday world and ourselves yielded by this kind of technology. Augmented reality is going to be the most diffused technology in our everyday life in the near future, especially augmented reality mounted on glasses. This near future is not only possible, but it seems inevitable following the vertiginous development of AR. There are numerous kinds of different prototypes that are going to come out next year (2016). Therefore, a study on how these modifications yield knock-on effects on the constitution of the object and subject is mandatory. This work tackles the topic starting from a phenomenological and post-phenomenological point of view and it analyses the modification yielded by such technology from a perceptual point of view using the analysis of the horizons of the object made by Husserl. We need this analysis because it is not only the hypothetical future that may never come, but it is the likely future very close to us that is putting pressure on us.

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Notes

  1. We will take into consideration glasses and not contact lenses because, at the moment, they are the most developed ones. On contact lenses see Parviz (2009).

  2. Even if it is a speculative analysis, we will treat the topic as if AR glasses will be pervasively used in the future.

  3. We can find AR glasses commonly used in literature. Many AR glasses will be produced in the near future. See for example Moverio BT-200 Smart Glasses by Epson (http://www.epson.com/cgi-bin/Store/jsp/Landing/moverio-bt-200-smart-glasses.do?ref=van_moverio_2014), Vuzix M100 Smart Glasses by Vuzix (http://www.vuzix.com/), Laster SeeThru by Laster technologies (http://laster.fr/products/seethru/) or CastAR by Technical Illusions (http://castar.com/). For a more classic reference see, for example, Gibson (1993).

  4. Obviously, the modifications yielded by technologies are different according to the kind of technology used. Therefore, the modifications that AR implies are not the same as the one produced by other kinds of technologies, such as hearing aid technology (Ihde 2007) or the cane of a blind man (Merleau-Ponty 1945).

  5. Technology, in addition to the function for which it is expressively designed, deeply changes the perceiving subject and the perceived object. Therefore, we can talk about knock-on effects in relation to this “secondary” action.

  6. We use the concept of “everyday world” with the tacit assumption that it is the Lebenswelt in the Husserlian phenomenological analysis. Therefore, we use the concept of “everyday world” to identify the world embedded with praxes related to the community where the subject lives.

  7. We will see that these “parts” are the “horizons” of the object in Husserl. See “Husserl’s horizons” section.

  8. Classic glasses are a classic example especially for the researches related to phenomenology and perception. For example see the text related to the post-phenomenological analysis (see Ihde 1990, 2008; Verbeek 2005, 2011).

  9. See point number 2.

  10. This paper uses the concept of “constitution of the object” according to the phenomenological tradition which is different from usual realism.

  11. In the past, the most impressive innovation was the introduction of smart-phones in our society in a widespread way. Everyone becomes “computerised” by having with them a small computer. AR, at the moment, can work on mobile devices and this element helps to spread it by surfing the diffusion of smart-phones. Moreover, AR represents the merging point among virtual reality, robotics and the studies on human computer interface, therefore it represents a “hot point” where everyone is going to work. For example the studies concerning the shift in interaction from textual information to an embodied interaction (See, for example the following sites, Dourish 2004; Kaptelinin et al. 2003; Rogers 2004; Williams et al. 2005) has to take into account AR in the future because AR allows us to interact with computers in the most natural way using our entire body.

  12. See, for example, the prototypes we already introduced such as Moverio BT-200 Smart Glasses by Epson, Vuzix M100 Smart Glasses by Vuzix, Laster SeeThru by Laster technologies or CastAR by Technical Illusions.

  13. We will use the terms “to shape”, “to mould” and “to modify” in order to underline how the technology modifies what is around us by its not-neutrality because it actively acts moulding and shaping our surrounding and ourselves as the potter does with pottery.

  14. We are going to use the “visual” metaphor for perception in the whole text. However, it should not be considered as an explicit way to give more importance to sight instead of the other senses. Sight could be substituted by every other sense. We are going to use this metaphor only for two reasons:

    1. 1.

      Science usually prefers sight among other senses.

    2. 2.

      The focal point of this work is “glasses”, therefore we are forced to analyse sight more than the other senses.

    Thus, even if partial, it is a useful approximation.

  15. One of the most significant achievements of Husserlian phenomenology is to have described and reflected upon different modes of giveness of objects, including the forms of “non-presence”or “absence” (Lohmar and Yamaguchi 2010, p. 293).

  16. See (Husserl 2001, §1) “Die äußere Wahrnehmung ist eine beständige Prätention, etwas zu leisten, was sie ihrem eigenen Wesen nach zu leisten außerstande ist.”(Husserl 1996, §1, p. 3).

  17. We do not need to focus our attention on how these “hidden” faces of the object are given to the subject. We can highlight only that there are two main different interpretations (See, for example, Dahlstrom 2006, p. 214, Madary 2012 and Kelly 2004). The first one takes the hidden faces as actually present in the object and therefore the subject actually perceives them with the “manifest” ones and “in” them. For example, Sean Kelly classifies Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in this first position because “Merleau-Ponty claims that they (the indeterminate features of an object) have a positive presence in our experience” (Kelly 2004, p. 79). The second one considers them hidden in the literal sense and thus this second position considers them absent and not perceived in the manifest faces. For example, Sean Kelly classifies the Husserlian approach in this second position. “In Husserl’s account of object transcendence, the principal move is to distinguish between the features of the object that are experienced by me as determinate (roughly, those features for which I have sense data) and the features of the object that are experienced by me as indeterminate (roughly, everything else)” (Kelly 2004, p. 78). Even if in Kelly’s account Husserl identified the absent aspects of the object as something to be “known”, “believed”, “hypothesised” or “expected” (Kelly 2004), while Husserl never referred to them in these terms. However, in both cases, we have a different modality of “perception” with which these hidden faces are perceived and this element is enough for us because we need to know only if they can be differentiated or not. They can be differentiated and so we can consider the perception of an object split in two parts: the manifest aspects and the hidden ones. Identifying with \({}^{n}O_{h}^{w}\) the i aspect of the object n that is seen in the w way (Manifest and Hidden). We have:

    $$\begin{aligned} {}^{n}O = \bigcup _{i} {{}^{n}O_{i}^{ Manifest }} + \bigcup _{j} {{}^{n}O_{j}^{ Hidden } } \end{aligned}$$
  18. At first the term “horizon” was used in the same way as “halo” and “background”. “‘Horizont’ gilt hier also soviel wie in §35, S. 62, die Rede von einem “Hof”und “Hintergrund”” (Husserl 1950, §83, p. 186).

  19. Das Erfassen ist ein Herausfassen, jedes Wahrgenommene hat einen Erfahrungshintergrund. Rings um das Papier liegen Bücher, Stifte, Tintenfaß usw., in gewisser Weise auch “wahrgenommen”, perzeptiv da, im “Anschauungsfelde”, aber während der Zuwendung zum Papier entbehrten sie jeder, auch nur sekundären Zuwendung und Erfassung (Husserl 1950, p. 62).

  20. We are going to give references to Husserl’s texts for any kind of horizon in its related section.

  21. For such distinctions see, for example, Dahlstrom (2006), (Drummond 2007, p. 96).

  22. See “The inner horizon” section.

  23. See “The outer horizon” section.

  24. See “The world horizon” section.

  25. So hat jede Erfahrung von einem einzelnen Ding ihren Innenhorizont; und “Horizont“ bedeutet hierbei die wasensmäßig zu jeder Erfahrung gehörige und von ihr untrennbare Induktion in jeder Erfahrung selbst. (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 28; Husserl 1996, p. 7; Husserl 1965, §49, p. 146).

  26. “Jedes Ding ist a priori als erfüllter Raumkörper beweglich, und in infinitum” (Husserl 1973, §35, p. 121). “Its inner horizon comprises what we have recently been considering as ’absent’ in a perception of an object: the further parts and aspects of the object itself that are not exhibited in a particular experience of the object, but are only ‘empty meant’” (Smith 2003, p. 75).

  27. And without inner horizons, all perception would be adequate. We would take the one-side presentation of a thing for the thing (Hopp 2011).

  28. Around this focus there is a halo of potential perceptions shading off the meaning of the focal center (...) However, this caracterisation of the horizon is as yet one-sided (Kuhn 1968, p. 112).

  29. Identifying with \({}^{S_n}O_f^j\) the face f of the object O seen by the subject S in the spatial position n in a j way. Therefore with \(^{S_{ Front }}O_{ Front }^{ Direct }\) we intend the perception of the front face of the object seen by a subject in front of the object and in a direct way.

  30. See “The inner horizon” section.

  31. In this case it is not necessary to understand if the perception through a reflection is perceived as mediated by a mirror thanks to the mental activity of the subject that recognises the mirror as a “mirror”. Therefore, it is not important to understand if the mediated perception is done without the understanding of the subject (the phenomenological way) or with it (see Eco 2001). The only thing important here is to catch that there is a difference between the two.

  32. Das heißt, jedes erfahrene Ding hat nicht nur einen Innerhorizont, sodern es hat auch einen offen endlosen Außenhorizont von Mitobjekten (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 28).

  33. The perceiving thing, the box before me, is more than its momentary appearance, it is also more than the multiplicity of its aspects. It is on the table, beside the inkstand, in the study, serving as a receptacle for pencils. It has its “outer horizon” as well as its inner (Kuhn 1968, p. 112).

  34. Im eigentlichen Wahrnehmen, als einem Gewahren, bin ich dem Gegenstade, z.B. dem Papier zugewendet, ich erfasse es als dieses hier und jetzt Seiende. Das Erfassen ist ein Herausfassen, jedes Wahrgenommene hat einen Erfahrungshintergrund. Rings um das Papier liegen Bücher, Stifte, Tintenfaß usw., in gewisser Weise auch “wahrgenommen”, perzeptiv da, im “Anschauungsfelde”, aber während der Zuwendung zum Papier entbehrten sie jeder, auch nur sekundären Zuwendung und Erfassung (Husserl 1950, p. 62,§35).

  35. See Husserl’s example of a wax figure or a mannequin (Husserl 1973, §15, p. 45); Husserl 1939, §21b, pp. 99, 100; Husserl 1980, §23).

  36. See (Husserl 1965, §49, p. 147).

  37. First of all, we must point out that the concept of “Welthorizont” is quite a problematic term even for the translation: it can be identified as “Horizont der Welt” or as “Welt als Horizont”. See (Geniusas 2012, §10.2, p. 179).

  38. We could extend the whole experience of the subject by including the whole experience related to the community where the subject lives. However, we need only the basic conception of the world horizon in order to understand how to deal with it and we will not deal with intersubjectivity.

  39. Even a blade of grass in the middle of a field has its hidden faces and we anticipate them on the basis of its visible one.

  40. “The realm of natural experience constitutes the “total horizon”” (it is held to encompass all that is), which is called “the world” (Brainard 2002, p. 38).

  41. Husserl on his part developed this notion to an all-encompassing trascendental concept of “world horizon” which functions, so to speak, on the back of everyday consciousness (Cho 2007, p. 11).

  42. Es besteht aber ein grundsätzlicher Unterschied in der Weise des Weltbewußtseins und des Dingbewußteins, des Objektbewußtseins (in einem weitesten, aber rein lebensweltlichen Sinne), während andererseits eines und das andere eine untrennbare Einheit bilden (Husserl 1976, §37, p. 146).

  43. Welt gibt es für Husserl nicht an sich, so wenig wie für Kant. (Fink 1990, p. 149).

  44. See (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 33).

  45. The inner horizon (section “The inner horizon”) and the outer horizon (section “The outer horizon”).

  46. See (Husserl 1939, §21; Geniusas 2012, p. 185).

  47. That means the subject always takes the perceived object as something predelineated. The object always gives itself as a typified object. “Die Auffassung als “Gegenstand überhaupt”—noch in völliger Unbestimmtheit, Unbekanntheit—bringt also schon ein Moment der Bekanntheit mit sich, eben als eines Etwas, das “irgendwie ist” , das explikabel ist und nach dem, was es ist, bekannt werder kann; und zwar als ein Etwas, das im Horizont der Welt als Allheit des Seienden daristeht, das selbst schon so weit bekannt ist, daß es Seiendes “in der Welt” ist, korrelativ gesprochen Seiendes, das eingehen muß in die Einheit userer strömenden Erfahrung.” (Husserl 1939, §8, p. 35).

  48. See (Husserl 1939, p. 33).

  49. See (Geniusas 2012, §12.1).

  50. In the case of the inner and the outer horizon. See sections “The inner horizon” and “The outer horizon”.

  51. See “The inner horizon”, “The outer horizon” and The world horizon” sections.

  52. We use a phenomenological concept of constitution of an object. The description of how the object is constituted cannot be discussed herein details. In order to have a more complete analysis on it see Geniusas (2012), Sokolowski (1970) and Biceaga (2010).

  53. Identifying the object with \(O_{ Naked }^{i}\) the manifest aspects of the object perceived in a naked way, with \(O_{ Tech }^{j}\) the manifest aspects of the object perceived through technology, with \(O_{ Naked }^{k}\) the hidden aspects of the object perceived in a naked way, with \(O_{ Tech }^{h}\) the hidden aspects of the object perceived through technology.

  54. Or near objects if we are talking about presbyter subjects and not myopic ones.

  55. We are assuming short-sightedness in this example.

  56. We can identify these two consequences as different aspects because we can focus our attention on the subject or on the object separately. However they are two sides of the same coin because of a modification in one of them yields a modification in the other one.

  57. The object is made up of its aspects, which means they are part of it and they form it as an unity that is perceived by the subject. Therefore, we can use the term “reconstitution” because the object is shaped by the technology used. The “old” constitution related to a naked subject has to change in favour of the “technological subject” who uses the technology to modify its perceptual capabilities.

  58. See above at the beginning of this section.

  59. These “new” details are related to something “in” the object, therefore, it is the inner horizon that is modified by the technology.

  60. Obviously the glasses yield a modification of the outer horizon as well because even what lies in the background is “improved” with more definition.

  61. It is not a subject’s re-constitution in the sense that the subject gets some new capabilities thanks to the technology, but in the sense that the subject’s perceptual capabilities are “normalised” according to the technology used. The important point here is not if the perceptual capabilities are modified by the technology, but if the perceptual capabilities are “normalised” by them. The normal subject is shaped according to the presence of such technologies which give a standard for the abilities the subject must have. The stress falls on the creation of a new standard and not on the novelty of the perceptual capabilities provided by technology.

  62. We are going to use the term “augmentation” in order to identify the “product” of AR technologies.

  63. See, for example, the glasses developed by META https://www.spaceglasses.com/.

  64. Such as DAQRI http://www.daqri.com/.

  65. See, for example, Fig. 1.

  66. See ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” section.

  67. See “The outer horizon” section.

  68. See “The outer horizon” section.

  69. Where with j stands for the classic elements of the background and i for the elements of the informational background.

  70. See ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” section.

  71. As in the previous case the object without details was seen as blurred. See at page xxx.

  72. See http://www.ingress.com/.

  73. See ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” section.

  74. That has become a “normal” part of the background.

  75. We are choosing a dump but it could be any place of the city.

  76. We used the term “body” in the sense of the phenomenological term Leib.

  77. See ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” section.

  78. See ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” section.

  79. See, for example, Fig. 2.

  80. We use the term “real environment” according to the classic distinction made by Milgram. He identified a continuum with two extremes: the the “real environment”, which is the world without digital elements in it, and the “virtual reality”, which is the world created entirely by computers. See Milgram (1994).

  81. See ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” and “The first kind of AR glasses” above sections.

  82. Identifying with \(O_{i}^{w}\) the aspect i of the object O perceived in the w way (in the naked way or in the technological one).

  83. Identifying with \(O_{i}^{w}\) the object i perceived in the w way (natural way or technological and augmented one) and with \(World ^{S_{n}}\) the world where the subject \(S_{n}\) lives.

  84. That is the classic conception of augmented reality where it is represented as the intertwinement of digital data and real objects.

  85. The case of the classic glasses (see ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” section). Moreover, we can take into account even the modification yielded by the first kind of AR (see “The first kind of AR glasses” section), because it is similar.

  86. See also the modification created by the first kind of AR glasses “The first kind of AR glasses” section.

  87. See also the modification on the subject yielded by the first kind of AR glasses. See “The first kind of AR glasses” section.

  88. See ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications” section.

  89. See “The first kind of AR glasses” section.

  90. There are many technologies that embed our world and without which we cannot live so “easily”. Moreover this is not something that is related to our “time” or to our culture. Every culture always follows the same constitution relation we have shown before and it has to deal with the re-constitution of the object through technology. Therefore it is not a “topic” related to our “western” culture only. However, this new second type of AR technology has a peculiar effect. It is not a sole reconstitution of the world where the subject lives, but it implies an introduction of new objects in our world. While other technologies simply modify other pre-existing objects, now the technology creates the world on its own.

  91. We are not assuming the AR ballot will replace the paper-based one. This example shows only that part of the world of such a society could be inaccessible by who does not use AR technology.

  92. See sections ““Optical” classic glasses and their modifications”, “The first kind of AR glasses” and “The second kind of AR glasses”.

  93. Such as Google Glass.

  94. See “The first kind of AR glasses” section.

  95. See “The second kind of AR glasses” section.

  96. We should not focus the attention on the direct effect of the technology only. This work shows there is another hidden level related to how the technology shapes the subject and the objects around them. Therefore, the ethical questions about the goodness or the badness of a technology should not be restricted to what the subject can do with such a technology, but they should focus the attention also on how they are shaped by it.

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Acknowledgments

Nicola Liberati worked on Sects. 1, 2 and 4. Shoji Nagataki worked on Sect. 3. Nicola Liberati is supported by the PostDoctoral Research Fellowship of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) No. P14782. Shoji Nagataki is supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), No. 25370034.

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Liberati, N., Nagataki, S. The AR glasses’ “non-neutrality”: their knock-on effects on the subject and on the giveness of the object. Ethics Inf Technol 17, 125–137 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-015-9370-0

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