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Bidirectional Optimization from Reasoning and Learning in Games

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Abstract

We reopen the investigation into the formal and conceptual relationship between bidirectional optimality theory (Blutner in J Semant 15(2):115–162, 1998, J Semant 17(3):189–216, 2000) and game theory. Unlike a likeminded previous endeavor by Dekker and van Rooij (J Semant 17:217–242, 2000), we consider signaling games not strategic games, and seek to ground bidirectional optimization once in a model of rational step-by-step reasoning and once in a model of reinforcement learning. We give sufficient conditions for equivalence of bidirectional optimality and the former, and show based on numerical simulations that bidirectional optimization may be thought of as a process of reinforcement learning with lateral inhibition.

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Franke, M., Jäger, G. Bidirectional Optimization from Reasoning and Learning in Games. J of Log Lang and Inf 21, 117–139 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-011-9151-z

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