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Abstract

Selfish bin packing can be viewed as the non-cooperative version of bin packing problem, where every item is a selfish agent and wants to minimize his sharing cost with the other items packing in the same bin. In this paper, we focus on designing a new mechanism (a payoff rule) for selfish bin packing, called modified Dutch treatment mechanism. We first show that the pure Nash equilibrium exists and it can be obtained in polynomial time. We then prove that under the new mechanism, the price of anarchy is between 1.47407 and 1.4748, improving the known results.

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Correspondence to Qizhi Fang.

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A preliminary version of this submission was published in COCOA 2017.

This work is partially supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 11871442 and 11201439) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 201964006).

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Chen, X., Nong, Q. & Fang, Q. An improved mechanism for selfish bin packing. J Comb Optim 42, 636–656 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-019-00476-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-019-00476-0

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