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The Deregulated Electricity Market Viewed as a Bilevel Programming Problem

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a bilevel programming formulation of a deregulated electricity market. By examining the electricity market in this format, we achieve two things. First, the relation of the deregulated electricity market to general economic models that can be formulated as bilevel programming problems (e.g. Stackelberg leader-follower games and principal-agency models) becomes clear. Secondly, it provides an explanation of the reason why the so-called “folk theorems” can be proven to be false for electricity networks. The interpretation of the deregulated electricity market as a bilevel program also indicates the magnitude of the error that can be made if the electricity market model studied does not take into account the physical constraints of the electric grid, or oversimplifies the electricity network to a radial network.

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Correspondence to Mette Bjørndal.

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Bjørndal, M., Jørnsten, K. The Deregulated Electricity Market Viewed as a Bilevel Programming Problem. J Glob Optim 33, 465–475 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-004-1939-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-004-1939-9

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