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On a generalized Cournot oligopolistic competition game

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Abstract

We consider a model whereby players compete for a set of shared resources to produce and sell substitute products in the same market, which can be viewed as a generalization of the classical Cournot oligopolistic competition model, or, from a different angle, the Wardrop type routing model. In particular, we suppose that there are K players, who compete for the usage of resources as well as the sales of the end-products. Moreover, the unit costs of the shared resources and the selling prices of the products are assumed to be affine linear functions in the consumption/production quantities. We show that the price of anarchy in this case is lower bounded by 1/K, and this bound is essentially tight, which manifests the harsh nature of the competitive market for the producers.

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Correspondence to Shuzhong Zhang.

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Shuzong Zhang—on leave from Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong.

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He, S., Wang, X. & Zhang, S. On a generalized Cournot oligopolistic competition game. J Glob Optim 56, 1335–1345 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-012-9844-0

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