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Adaptive Auction Framework for Spectrum Market in Cognitive Radio Networks

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Abstract

For the recent decade, cognitive radio networks have received much attention as an alternative to the traditional static spectrum allocation policy since the licensed spectrum channels are not being used efficiently. The most critical issue of the cognitive radio networks is how to distribute the idle spectrum channels to the secondary users opportunistically. The auction-based market is desirable for the trade of idle spectrum channels since the secondary users can purchase a channel in timely manner and the licensed primary users can earn the additional profit while not using the channels. Among the auction algorithms proposed for the spectrum market, we focus on the TASG framework, which consists of two nested auction algorithms, because it enables the group-buying of spectrum channels for the secondary users with limited budgets, and possesses many positive properties such as budget-balance, individual rationality and truthfulness. However, the TASG framework is not very attractive to the market participants since the seller earns the small revenue and the buyer has the low utility. In this paper, we propose a new auction framework for the spectrum markets, called aDaptive and Economically robust Auction-based Leasing (DEAL), that keeps all the benefits of TASG while improving the utility (or revenue) of the participants. To this end, we develop an enhanced inner-auction algorithm, called the Global Auction algorithm in our DEAL framework, and adapt the involved parameters dynamically based on the previous bids from the potential buyers. Simulation results demonstrate that our framework significantly outperforms the previous TASG.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the 2015 Yeungnam University Research Grant.

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  1. Yeungnam University, 280 Daehak-Ro, Gyeongsan, Gyeongbuk, 38541, Republic of Korea

    Muhammad Shafiq & Jin-Ghoo Choi

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  1. Muhammad Shafiq
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  2. Jin-Ghoo Choi
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Correspondence to Jin-Ghoo Choi.

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Shafiq, M., Choi, JG. Adaptive Auction Framework for Spectrum Market in Cognitive Radio Networks. J Netw Syst Manage 26, 518–546 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10922-017-9429-9

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