Abstract
This is a paper about the constituents of arguments. It argues that several different kinds of truth-bearer may be taken to compose arguments, but that none of the obvious candidates—sentences, propositions, sentence/truth-value pairs etc.—make sense of logic as it is actually practiced. The paper goes on to argue that by answering the question in different ways, we can generate different logics, thus ensuring a kind of logical pluralism that is different from that of J. C. Beall and Greg Restall.
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Russell, G. ONE TRUE LOGIC?. J Philos Logic 37, 593–611 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-008-9082-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-008-9082-6