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Nothing but the Truth

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Abstract

A curious feature of Belnap’s “useful four-valued logic”, also known as first-degree entailment (FDE), is that the overdetermined value B (both true and false) is treated as a designated value. Although there are good theoretical reasons for this, it seems prima facie more plausible to have only one of the four values designated, namely T (exactly true). This paper follows this route and investigates the resulting logic, which we call Exactly True Logic.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. LOGOS-Group, Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science, University of Barcelona, C. Montalegre 6-8, Barcelona, 08001, Spain

    Andreas Pietz

  2. Research Center for Integrated Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 1-1 Asahidai, Nomi, Ishikawa, 923-1292, Japan

    Umberto Rivieccio

Authors
  1. Andreas Pietz
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  2. Umberto Rivieccio
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Correspondence to Andreas Pietz.

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Pietz, A., Rivieccio, U. Nothing but the Truth. J Philos Logic 42, 125–135 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9215-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9215-1

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