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The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument

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Abstract

It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Physics, University of Edinburgh, Bristol, UK

    Darrell P. Rowbottom

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol, BS8 1TB, UK

    Darrell P. Rowbottom

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  1. Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Correspondence to Darrell P. Rowbottom.

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Rowbottom, D.P. The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument. Stud Logica 87, 65–71 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2

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