Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures

  • Published:
Studia Logica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Boyd, R., ‘Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method’, in Savage (ed.), 1990, pp. 355–391. (Reprinted in Papineau (ed.), 1996, pp. 215–255.)

  2. Bueno O. (1997). ‘Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 28: 585–610

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Bueno O. (1999a). ‘What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting’. Erkenntnis 50: 59–85

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Bueno, O. ‘Empiricism, Conservativeness and Quasi–Truth’, Philosophy of Science 66 (Proceedings), (1999[b]), S474–S485.

  5. Bueno O. (2000). ‘Empiricism, Mathematical Change and Scientific Change’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 31: 269–296

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Bueno O. and de Souza E. (1996). ‘The Concept of Quasi–Truth’. Logique et Analyse 153/154: 183–199

    Google Scholar 

  7. Bueno O., French S. and Ladyman J. (2002). ‘On Representing the Relationship between the Mathematical and the Empirical’. Philosophy of Science 69: 497–518

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Bueno, O., and Shalkowski, ‘Modal Realism and Modal Epistemology, A Huge Gap’, in Weber and De Mey (eds.), 2004, pp. 93–106.

  9. Butterfield J., Pagonis C. (eds) (1999). From Physics to Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  10. Chiappin, J.R.N., Duhem’s Theory of Science, An Interplay Between Philosophy and History of Science, Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1989.

  11. Churchland P.M., Hooker C.A. (eds) (1985). Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply by Bas C .van Fraassen. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  12. da Costa N.C.A. (1986). ‘Pragmatic Probability’. Erkenntnis 25: 141–162

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. da Costa N.C.A. and French S. (1989). ‘Pragmatic Truth and the Logic of Induction’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40: 333–356

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. da Costa N.C.A. and French S. (1990). ‘The Model–Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science’. Philosophy of Science 57: 248–265

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. da Costa, N.C.A., and S. French, ‘Towards an Acceptable Theory of Acceptance, Partial Structures and the General Correspondence Principle’, in French and Kamminga (eds.), 1993, pp. 137–158.

  16. da Costa N.C.A. and French S. (2003). Science and Partial Truth. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  17. Dalla Chiara, M. L., K. Doets, D. Mundici, and J. van Benthem (eds.), Logic and Scientific Methods, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

  18. Demopoulos W. and Friedman M. (1985). ‘Critical Notice: Bertrand Russell’s The Analysis of Matter, Its Historical Context and Contemporary Influence’. Philosophy of Science 52: 621–639

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Duhem, P., The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (An English translation, by P.P. Wiener, was published in 1954.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1906.

  20. Field H. (1972). ‘Tarski’s Theory of Truth’. Journal of Philosophy 69: 347–375

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Field H. (1973). ‘Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference’. Journal of Philosophy 70: 462–481

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. French, S., ‘Models and Mathematics in Physics: The Role of Group Theory’, in Butterfield and Pagonis (eds.), 1999, pp. 187–207.

  23. French S. and Ladyman J. (1999). ‘Reinflating the Semantic Approach’. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13: 103–121

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. French S. and Ladyman J. (2003). ‘Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure’. Synthese 136: 31–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. French S., Kamminga H. (eds) (1993). Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: Essays in Honour of Heinz Post. Reidel, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  26. Greffe J.-L., Heinzmann G., Lorenz K. (eds) (1996). Henri Poincaré, Science and Philosophy. Akademie Verlag, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  27. Kuhn, T., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. (A second, enlarged edition was published in 1970.)

  28. Ladyman J. (1998). ‘What is Structural Realism?’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29: 409–424

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Laudan, L., ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Science 48 (1981), 19–49. (Reprinted in Leplin (ed.), 1984, pp. 218–249.)

  30. Laudan L. (1996). Beyond Positivism and Relativism. Westview Press, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  31. Leplin J. (eds) (1984). Scientific Realism. University of California Press, Berkeley

    Google Scholar 

  32. Lewis D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  33. Newman M.H.A. (1928). ‘Mr. Russell’s ‘Causal Theory of Perception’’. Mind 37: 137–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Mikenberg I., da Costa N.C.A. and Chuaqui R. (1986). ‘Pragmatic Truth and Approximation to Truth’. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 51: 201–221

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Miller D. (1994). Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence. Open Court, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  36. Muller, F.A., ‘The Equivalence Myth of Quantum Mechanics’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (1997), 35–61; 219–247.

  37. Papineau D. (eds) (1996). The Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  38. Poincaré H. (1905) Science and Hypothesis. New York, Dover

  39. Popper K.R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London

    Google Scholar 

  40. Putnam, H., Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers, volume 1. (Second edition.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

  41. Putnam H. (1980). ‘Models and Reality’. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45: 464–482 (Reprinted in Putnam (1983), pp. 1–25.)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. Putnam H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  43. Putnam H. (1983). Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers, volume 3. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  44. Rédei M. (1997). ‘Why John von Neumann did not Like the Hilbert Space Formalism of Quantum Mechanics (and What He Liked Instead)’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28: 493–510

    Google Scholar 

  45. Rédei M. (1998). Quantum Logic in Algebraic Approach. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  46. Russell B. (1927). The Analysis of Matter. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  47. Savage, C.W. (ed.), Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.

  48. van Fraassen B.C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  49. van Fraassen, B.C., ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’, in Churchland and Hooker (eds.), 1985, pp. 245–308.

  50. van Fraassen B.C. (1989). Laws and Symmetry. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  51. van Fraassen B.C. (1991). Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  52. van Fraassen, B.C., ‘Structure and Perspective, Philosophical Perplexity and Paradox’, in Dalla Chiara et al. (eds.), 1997, pp. 511–530.

  53. von Neumann, J., Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. (The English translation, by Robert T. Beyer, of the original German edition was first published in 1955.) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1932.

  54. Weber E., De Mey T. (eds) (2004). Modal Epistemology. Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium, Brussels

    Google Scholar 

  55. Worrall J. (1989). ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’. Dialectica 43: 99–124

    Article  Google Scholar 

  56. Zahar, E., ‘Poincaré’s Structural Realism and his Logic of Discovery’, in Greffe et al. (eds.), 1996, pp. 45–68.

  57. Zahar E. (1997). ‘Poincaré’s Philosophy of Geometry, or does Geometric Conventionalism Deserve its Name?’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28: 183–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33124, USA

    Otávio Bueno

Authors
  1. Otávio Bueno
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Otávio Bueno.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bueno, O. Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures. Stud Logica 89, 213–235 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9127-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9127-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation