Abstract
This article reveals one general scheme for creating counter examples to Bayesian confirmation theory. The reason of the problems is that: in daily life the degree of confirmation is affected not only by probability but also by some non-probabilistic factors, e.g., structural similarity, quantity of evidence, and marginal utility, while Bayesian confirmation theory considers only probabilities to measure the degree of confirmation. This article resolves these problems after some detail analyses, and proposes a new confirmation measure based on these factors.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China [16CZX051]. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
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Yuan, Y. Bayesian Confirmation or Ordinary Confirmation?. Stud Logica 108, 425–449 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-019-09859-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-019-09859-0