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Truth-Making without Truth-Makers

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Abstract

The article is primarily concerned with the notion of a truth-maker. An explication for this notion is offered, which relates it to other notions of making something such-and-such. In particular, it is shown that the notion of a truth-maker is a close relative of a concept employed by van Inwagen in the formulation of his Consequence Argument. This circumstance helps understanding the general mechanisms of the concepts involved. Thus, a schematic explication of a whole battery of related notions is offered. It is based on an explanatory notion, introduced by the sentential connector “because”, whose function is examined in some detail. Finally, on the basis of the explication proposed, an argument is developed to the effect that the objects usually regarded as truth-makers are not apt to play this role.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle Park 6, 20146, Hamburg, Germany

    Benjamin Schnieder

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  1. Benjamin Schnieder
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Correspondence to Benjamin Schnieder.

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Schnieder, B. Truth-Making without Truth-Makers. Synthese 152, 21–46 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-7905-8

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