Abstract
In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition, according to which a whole hierarchy of congruences leads to different kinds of objects.
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Béziau, JY. Sentence, proposition and identity. Synthese 154, 371–382 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9124-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9124-y