Abstract
Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
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Capps, D., Lynch, M.P. & Massey, D. A coherent moral relativism. Synthese 166, 413–430 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9279-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9279-1