Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

One strand in the rule-following considerations

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I argue that a target of the rule-following considerations is the thought that there are mental episodes in which a consciously accessible item guides me in my decision to respond in a certain way when I follow a rule. I contend that Wittgenstein’s position on this issue invokes a distinction between a literal and a symbolic reading of the claim that these processes of guidance take place. In the literal sense he rejects the claim, but in the symbolic sense he sees nothing wrong with it. I consider some arguments that Wittgenstein deploys against the literal sense of the claim.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Fodor J.A. (1978). Propositional attitudes. The Monist 61, 501–523

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Oxford, Blackwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar B. (1985). Critical review of Saul Kripke. Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Noûs 19, 273–280

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDowell J. (1984). Wittgenstein on following a rule. Synthese 58, 325–363

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDowell J. (1992). Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In: French P., Uehling T. Jr., Wettstein H.K. (eds). Midwest studies in philosophy, Vol. XVII: The Wittgenstein legacy. Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 40–52

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein L. (1969). The blue and brown books. Oxford, Basil Blackwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein L. (2001). Philosophical investigations. Oxford, Blackwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright C. (1980). Wittgenstein on the foundations of mathematics. London, Duckworth

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright C. (2007). Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein’s quietism and the constitutive question. Ratio (New Series) 20, 481–502

    Google Scholar 

  • Zalabardo J.L. (1997). Kripke’s normativity argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27(4): 467–488

    Google Scholar 

  • Zalabardo J.L. (2001). Towards a nominalist empiricism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101, 29–52

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zalabardo J.L. (2003). Wittgenstein on accord. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84, 311–329

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, England, UK

    José L. Zalabardo

Authors
  1. José L. Zalabardo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to José L. Zalabardo.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Zalabardo, J.L. One strand in the rule-following considerations. Synthese 171, 509–519 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9323-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9323-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation