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Minimalism deflated: independence without substance

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Abstract

The paper examines Wright’s attempt to inflate deflationism about truth. It accepts the details of Wright’s argument but contends that it should best be seen as posing a dilemma for the deflationist: either truth is independent of norms of warranted assertibility—in which case it is substantial—or it is not—in which case epistemicism about truth is a consequence. Some concerns about epistemicism are raised in avoiding the second horn. The first is avoided by distinguishing between independence and substantiality and arguing that only the first applies to truth and only the second is worrisome to deflationism. So, despite its sub-title, the following is not a diatribe against Home Rule but a modest defence of deflationism.

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  1. University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa

    Bernhard Weiss

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  1. Bernhard Weiss
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Correspondence to Bernhard Weiss.

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Weiss, B. Minimalism deflated: independence without substance. Synthese 171, 521–529 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9324-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9324-8

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