Abstract
This paper undermines a paradigmatic form of sceptical reasoning. It does this by describing, and then dialectically dissolving, the sceptical-independence presumption, upon which that form of sceptical reasoning relies.
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Hetherington, S. Sceptical possibilities? No worries. Synthese 168, 97–118 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9332-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9332-8