Abstract
Although choice and preference are distinct categories, it may in some contexts be a useful idealization to treat choices as fully determined by preferences. In order to construct a general model of such preference-based choice, a method to derive choices from preferences is needed that yields reasonable outcomes for all preference relations, even those that are incomplete and contain cycles. A generalized choice function is introduced for this purpose. It is axiomatically characterized and is shown to compare favourably with alternative constructions.
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Hansson, S.O. Preference-based choice functions: a generalized approach. Synthese 171, 257–269 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9650-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9650-5