Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Logic in general philosophy of science: old things and new things

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alchourrón C. E., Gärdenfors P., Makinson D. (1985) On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50: 510–530

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carnap R. (1967) The logical structure of the world. Pseudoproblems in philosophy. University of California Press, California

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland P. M. (1989) A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Demopoulos W., Friedman M. (1985) The concept of structure in Russell’s the analysis of matter. Philosophy of Science 52(4): 621–639

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flach, P. A. (1996). Rationality postulates for induction. In Shoham, Y. (Eds.), Proceedings of theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, TARK’96 (pp. 267–281). San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann.

  • Gabbay D. M. (1985) Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning in expert systems. In: Apt K. R. (ed.) Logics and models of concurrent systems. Springer, Berlin, pp 439–458

    Google Scholar 

  • Glymour C. (1992) Android epistemology: Computation, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of science. In: Salmon M. H. (ed.) Introduction to the philosophy of science. Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, pp 364–403

    Google Scholar 

  • Grove A. (1988) Two modellings for theory change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17: 157–170

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hild M., Spohn W. (2008) The measurement of ranks and the laws of iterated contraction. Artificial Intelligence 172(10): 1195–1218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelly, K. T. (1998). The learning power of iterated belief revision. In Gilboa, I. (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh TARK conference (pp. 111–125). Illinois: Evanston.

  • Ketland J. (2004) Empirical adequacy and ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 287–300

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kraus S., Lehmann D. J., Magidor M. (1990) Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics. Artificial Intelligence 44(1–2): 167–207

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuipers T. A. F. (2007) Introduction. Explication in philosophy of science. In: Kuipers T. A. F. (ed.) General philosophy of science—focal issues, handbook of the philosophy of science (Vol. 1). Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp vii–xxiii

    Google Scholar 

  • Leitgeb H. (2004) Inference on the low level. An investigation into deduction, nonmonotonic reasoning, and the philosophy of cognition. Kluwer Applied Logic Series, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Leitgeb H. (2005) Interpreted dynamical systems and qualitative laws: From inhibition networks to evolutionary systems. Synthese 146: 189–202

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leitgeb, H. (2007). Neural network models of conditionals: An introduction. In Arrazola, X. Larrazabal, J. M. et al. (Eds.), LogKCA-07, proceedings of the first ILCLI international workshop on logic and philosophy of knowledge, communication and action (pp. 191–223). Bilbao: University of the Basque Country Press.

  • Leitgeb, H. (2007). A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals (Unpublished draft).

  • Leitgeb, H. (forthcoming). New life for Carnap’s Aufbau? Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9605-x.

  • Leitgeb H., Ladyman J. (2008) Criteria of identity and structuralist ontology. Philosophia Mathematica 16: 388–396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leitgeb H., Segerberg K. (2007) Dynamic doxastic logic: Why, how, and where to?. Synthese 155(2): 167–190

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D. (1970) How to define theoretical terms. The Journal of Philosophy 67(13): 427–446

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mantzavinos C. (2005) Naturalistic hermeneutics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Maxwell G. (1970) Structural realism and the meaning of theoretical terms. In: Winokur S., Radner M. (eds) Analyses of theories and methods of physics and psychology, Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. 4). University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 181–192

    Google Scholar 

  • Newman M. H. A. (1928) Mr. Russell’s ‘causal theory of perception’. Mind 37(146): 137–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olsson E., Westlund D. (2006) On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change. Erkenntnis 65(2): 165–183

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reichenbach H. (1957) The philosophy of space and time. Dover, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Reichenbach H. (1959) The present state of the discussion on relativity. In: Reichenbach H. (ed.) Modern philosophy of science: Selected essays by Hans Reichenbach. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp 1–45

    Google Scholar 

  • Reichenbach H. (1965) The theory of relativity and a priori knowledge. University of California Press, California

    Google Scholar 

  • Reichenbach H. (1969) Axiomatization of the theory of relativity. University of California Press, California

    Google Scholar 

  • Rott H. (2008) Shifting priorities: Simple representations for twenty seven iterated theory change operators. In: Makinson D. (ed.) Towards mathematical philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 1–45

    Google Scholar 

  • Schurz G. (2001) Normische Gesetzeshypothesen und die wissenschaftsphilosophische Bedeutung des nichtmonotonen Schliessens. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32: 65–107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G. (forthcoming). Structural correspondence between theories and the justification of scientific realism. Synthese.

  • van Benthem J. (1982) The logical study of science. Synthese 51: 431–472

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Benthem J. et al (1989) Semantic parallels in natural language and computation. In: Ebbinghaus H.-D. (ed.) Logic colloquium, granada 1987. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 331–375

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • van Benthem J. (2007) Dynamic logic of belief revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17(2): 129–155

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Ditmarsch, H. P., van der Hoek, W., & Kooi, B. P. (2007). Dynamic epistemic logic (Synthese Library Vol. 337). New York: Springer.

  • Verein Ernst Mach (Eds.). (1929). Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis. Vienna: Artur Wolf Verlag.

  • Worrall J. (1989) Structural realism: The best of both worlds?. dialectica 43: 99–124

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departments of Philosophy and Mathematics, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol, BS8 1TB, UK

    Hannes Leitgeb

Authors
  1. Hannes Leitgeb
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hannes Leitgeb.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Leitgeb, H. Logic in general philosophy of science: old things and new things. Synthese 179, 339–350 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9776-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9776-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation