Abstract
An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ainsworth P. (2009) Newman’s objection. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60: 135–171
Bohnert H. G. (1968) In defense of Ramsey’s elimination method. Journal of Philosophy 65: 275–281
Braddon-Mitchell, D., Nola, R. (eds) (2009) Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Cruse P. (2005) Ramsey sentences, structural realism and trivial realization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36: 557–576
Demopoulos W., Friedman M. (1985) Critical notice: Bertrand Russell’s The analysis of matter: Its historical context and contemporary interest. Philosophy of Science 52: 621–639
Hempel, C. G. (1945). Studies in the logic of confirmation. Mind, 54, 1–26, 97–121. Reprinted in Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press.
Hempel, C. G. (1958). The theoretician’s dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction. Reprinted in Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press.
Hesse M. (1970a) Theories and the transitivity of confirmation. Philosophy of Science 37: 50–63
Hesse, M. (1970b). An inductive logic of theories. In Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. IV, pp. 164–180). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Hooker C. A. (1968) Craigian transcriptionism. American Philosophical Quarterly 5: 152–163
Ketland J. (2004) Empirical adequacy and Ramsification. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 409–424
Ketland, J. (2009). Empirical adequacy and Ramsification, II. In A. Heike & H. Leitgeb (Eds.), Reduction–abstraction–analysis. Proceedings of 31st international Wittgenstein symposium (pp. 29–45). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Ladyman J. (2002) Understanding philosophy of science. Routledge, London
Ladyman, J. (2008). Structural realism. In E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/.
Laudan L. (1981) A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science 48: 19–49
Laudan L. (1990) Demystifying underdetermination. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14: 267–297
Laudan L. (1998) Underdetermination. In: Craig E. (Ed.) The Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. Routledge, London
Melia J., Saatsi J. (2006) Ramsification and theoretical content. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57: 561–585
Newman M. H. A. (1928) Mr. Russell’s causal theory of perception. Mind 37: 137–148
Niiniluoto I. (1972) Inductive systematization: Definition and a critical survey. Synthese 25: 25–81
Niiniluoto, I. (1973). Empirically trivial theories and inductive systematization. In R. Bogdan & I. Niiniluoto (Eds.), Logic, language and probability. (A selection of papers from the IVth international congress in logic, methodology and the philosophy of science.) (pp. 108–114). Reidel.
Psillos, S. (2005). Underdetermination. In Encyclopedia of philosophy (2nd ed.). Gale MacMillan Reference.
Psillos S. (2006) Ramsey’s Ramsey sentences. In: Galavotti M. C. (Ed.) Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna circle. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 67–90
Ramsey F. (1931) Theories. In: Braithwaite R.B. (Ed.) The foundations of mathematics and other essays. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp 212–236
Scheffler I. (1963) The anatomy of inquiry. Alfred A. Knopf, New York
Scheffler I. (1968) Reflections on the Ramsey method. Journal of Philosophy 65: 269–274
Skyrms B. (1966) Nomological necessity and the paradoxes of confirmation. Philosophy of Science 33: 230–249
Stegmüller, W. (1970). Theorie und Erfarung, Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und analytischen Philosophie (Vol. II). Berlin: Springer.
Tuomela R. (1973) Theoretical concepts. Springer, Berlin
Tuomela R. (1974) Review. Journal of Symbolic Logic 39: 617–619
Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43, 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (Ed.), The philosophy of science (pp. 139–165). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Worrall, J., & Zahar, E. (2001). Ramseyfication and structural realism. Appendix IV in Zahar, E. (2001). Poincaré’s philosophy: From conventionalism to phenomenology (pp. 236–251). Chicago/La Salle: Open Court.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Raatikainen, P. Ramsification and inductive inference. Synthese 187, 569–577 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9861-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9861-9