Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

One wage of unknowability

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This article argues against fallibilist evidentialism on the basis of considerations about knowability.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alston W. (1988) An internalist externalism. Synthese 74: 265–283

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Comesaña J. (2006) A well-founded solution to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies 129: 27–47

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conee, E. (2001). Heeding misleading evidence. Philosophical Studies, 103, 99–120. Page references are to the reprint in Conee and Feldman 2004.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conee E., Feldman R. (2004) Evidentialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman R. (2003) Epistemology. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R. (1988). Having evidence. In D. Austen (Ed.), Philosophical analysis (pp. 83–104). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Reprinted with an Afterword in Conee and Feldman 2004.

  • Feldman R., Conee E. (2004) Making sense of skepticism. In: Conee E., Feldman R. (Eds.) Evidentialism.. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman A. (1979) What is justified belief?. In: Pappas G. (Ed.) Justification and knowledge. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Page references are to the reprint in Goldman’s Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences.. MA: MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman A. (2009) Williamson on knowledge and evidence. In: Pritchard (Ed.) D. (eds) Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Huemer M. (2007) Moore’s paradox and the norm of belief. In: Susana N., Gary (Ed.) S. (eds) Themes from G. E. Moore. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelly T. (2008) Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception. Philosophy Compass 3(5): 933–955

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein P. (1981) Certainty: A refutation of scepticism. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D. (1979) Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. Philosophical Review 88: 513–543

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neta R. (2008) What evidence do you have?. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 89–119

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salerno J. (2008) Knowability noir: 1945–1963. In: Salerno (Ed.) J. (eds) New essays on the knowability paradox. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Sutton J. (2005) Stick to what you know. Nous 39: 359–396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutton J. (2007) Without justification. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Unger P. (1975) Ignorance. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson T. (2000) Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA, 98225–9062, USA

    Dennis Whitcomb

Authors
  1. Dennis Whitcomb
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Dennis Whitcomb.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Whitcomb, D. One wage of unknowability. Synthese 190, 339–352 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0017-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0017-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation