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Kruse, A., Wansing, H. Introduction to the special issue “Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility”. Synthese 194, 2667–2671 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1153-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1153-6