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Designing differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms

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Abstract

It is urgent to solve the contradiction between limited spectrum resources and the increasing demand from the ever-growing wireless networks. Spectrum redistribution is a powerful way to mitigate the situation of spectrum scarcity.In contrast to existing mechanisms for spectrum redistribution, which aim to maximize the spectrum utilization and social welfare, we propose DIARY in this paper, which not only achieves approximate revenue maximization, but also guarantees bid privacy via differential privacy. Furthermore, we present an effective method to address the fairness issue in spectrum auctions. Results from extensive evaluations show that DIARY has substantial competitive advantages over existing mechanisms.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Chunchun Wu, Zuying Wei, Fan Wu & Guihai Chen

  2. Department of Information Systems, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA

    Shaojie Tang

Authors
  1. Chunchun Wu
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  2. Zuying Wei
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  3. Fan Wu
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  4. Guihai Chen
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  5. Shaojie Tang
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Correspondence to Fan Wu.

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Wu, C., Wei, Z., Wu, F. et al. Designing differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms. Wireless Netw 22, 105–117 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11276-015-0955-7

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