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Privacy-Preserving Yoking Proof with Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting

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Abstract

Yoking proof is a very useful security primitive that can be used to prove the co-existence of two or multiple entities in an identification protocol. It can be incorporated into radio frequency identification (RFID) protocols and used in many practical applications such as pharmaceutical distribution and manufacturing. However, the existing yoking proofs do not support secure key establishment, which is required in order to allow secure communication between the reader and the RFID tags after the identification process. In this paper, we propose a novel yoking proof with key exchange that allows the reader to establish a secure communication channel with the tags. We define the formal security models for yoking proof with key exchange and prove that the proposed protocol can achieve yoking proof soundness, session key security and tag identity privacy.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Dr. Man Ho Au, Dr. Yong Yu and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and discussions on this work. We also thank Ms. Diane Coves for polishing the content of this work.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong , NSW, 2522, Australia

    Yangguang Tian, Guomin Yang & Yi Mu

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  1. Yangguang Tian
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  2. Guomin Yang
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  3. Yi Mu
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Correspondence to Yangguang Tian.

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Tian, Y., Yang, G. & Mu, Y. Privacy-Preserving Yoking Proof with Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting. Wireless Pers Commun 94, 1017–1034 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-016-3667-0

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