Abstract
Crowdsourced spectrum sensing (CSS) has been regarded as an excellent technique to increase spectrum utilization and enhance spectrum service. To improve the participation of mobile users, some auction-based mechanisms have been proposed for crowdsourced spectrum sensing system. However, both multi-bid crowdsourced spectrum sensing and the bid privacy of participants in it have never been taken into consideration in those mechanisms. In this paper, we propose BPriCSS, the first mechanism to protect the bid privacy in spectrum-sensing participants selecting process in multi-bid CSS system. Moreover, considering different aims of the administrator, BPriCSS-MSC and BPriCSS-MAE are presented for minimizing the social cost and maximizing the average cost efficiency of winners, respectively. We prove that both BPriCSS-MSC and BPriCSS-MAE can simultaneously achieve differential bid privacy and truthfulness by theoretical analysis and simulation.
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Acknowledgments
This work is supported by National key R&D Program of China (No.2017YFB1400700), National High Technology R&D Program (863 Program) (No. 2015AA016007, 2015AA017203), Shaanxi Science and Technology Coordination and Innovation Project(2016TZC-G-6-3), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(BDZ011402, JB180303), National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61602364, 61602365, 61602356, 61602357),Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province (No.2017JM6083).
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This article belongs to the Topical Collection: Special Issue on Security and Privacy in Network Computing
Guest Editors: Xiaohong Jiang, Yongzhi Wang, Tarik Taleb, and Hua Wang
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Dong, X., Li, G., Zhang, T. et al. An incentive mechanism with bid privacy protection on multi-bid crowdsourced spectrum sensing. World Wide Web 23, 1035–1055 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11280-019-00673-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11280-019-00673-1