Utilizing Probabilistic Linear Equations in Cube Attacks

Abstract

Cube attacks, proposed by Dinur and Shamir at EUROCRYPT 2009, have shown huge power against stream ciphers. In the original cube attacks, a linear system of secret key bits is exploited for key recovery attacks. However, we find a number of equations claimed linear in previous literature actually nonlinear and not fit into the theoretical framework of cube attacks. Moreover, cube attacks are hard to apply if linear equations are rare. Therefore, it is of significance to make use of probabilistic linear equations, namely nonlinear superpolys that can be approximated by linear expressions effectively. In this paper, we suggest a way to test out and utilize these probabilistic linear equations, thus extending cube attacks to a wider scope. Concretely, we employ the standard parameter estimation approach and the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) for linearity test in the preprocessing phase, and use maximum likelihood decoding (MLD) for solving the probabilistic linear equations in the online phase. As an application, we exhibit our new attack against 672 rounds of Trivium and reduce the number of key bits to search by 7.