Abstract
We address the bodyguard allocation problem (BAP), an optimization problem that illustrates the conflict of interest between two classes of processes with contradictory preferences within a distributed system. While a class of processes prefers to minimize its distance to a particular process called the root, the other class prefers to maximize it; at the same time, all the processes seek to build a communication spanning tree with the maximum social welfare. The two state-of-the-art algorithms for this problem always guarantee the generation of a spanning tree that satisfies a condition of Nash equilibrium in the system; however, such a tree does not necessarily produce the maximum social welfare. In this paper, we propose a two-player coalition cooperative scheme for BAP, which allows some processes to perturb or break a Nash equilibrium to find another one with a better social welfare. By using this cooperative scheme, we propose a new algorithm called FFC-BAPS for BAP. We present both theoretical and empirical analyses which show that this algorithm produces better quality approximate solutions than former algorithms for BAP.
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Fernández-Zepeda, J.A., Brubeck-Salcedo, D., Fajardo-Delgado, D. et al. A Two-Player Coalition Cooperative Scheme for the Bodyguard Allocation Problem. J. Comput. Sci. Technol. 33, 823–837 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-018-1858-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-018-1858-8