Abstract
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the OpenOffice suite (release 2.0.3) with respect to viral threats, independently of any software flaw or vulnerability. First we will identify, then analyse the different potential viral vectors of OpenOffice.org v2.0.3. Our examination applies to win32 and Unix-like platforms. For each identified vector, a detailed study will show to which extend the infection is possible. From then on we will define the solutions in order to maximize OpenOffice.org security in the production field as well as in the office tools at the administration level.
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de Drézigué, D., Fizaine, JP. & Hansma, N. In-depth analysis of the viral threats with OpenOffice.org documents. J Comput Virol 2, 187–210 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-006-0020-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-006-0020-2