Abstract
Different from traditional tax audit, supervision with self-audit is a combination of audit by the taxpayer himself and audit by the tax authority. This paper mainly studies a taxpayer’s optimal policy of tax evasion under supervision with self-audit and its related properties, in order to deduce some effective suggestions and theoretical bases to restrain tax evasion. Assuming that only a certain proportion of evaded tax can be discovered when the audit is executed, the authors first formulate a static model with self-audit. This model is divided into two stages. At the first stage, taxpayers declare their taxes, then the tax authority chooses audit objects, based on a known probability, and announces the result; if the taxpayer is chosen, he will enter the second stage, during which he has a chance to pay the evaded tax and the corresponding late fees and then is audited by the tax authority. The authors show the existence and uniqueness of the optimal amount of tax evasion at the first stage and the optimal proportion to self-expose at the second stage. The authors also discuss the related properties of the interior solution, and do elasticity analyses on some parameters. Besides, the authors extend the static model into the corresponding two-period model, and study the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the extended model. Finally, under the assumption that tax evasion can only be discovered with a certain probability when the audit is executed, the authors formulate another static model with self-audit and investigate its properties.
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This research is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 60674082, 70221001, and 70731003.
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XIAO, T., LIU, K. & LAI, K.K. Tax Evasion: Models with Self-Audit. J Syst Sci Complex 21, 487–518 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-008-9131-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-008-9131-9