Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects

  • Published:
Journal of Systems Science and Complexity Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In many auctions, buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future. Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers. In this paper, two objects are sold sequentially and each buyer’s valuation for the second object is k times that for the first one, and the true value of k is sellers’ private information. The authors identify three factors which affect sellers’ revelation strategies: The market’s competition intensity which is characterized by the number of buyers, buyers’ prior information about the second object, and the difference degree between two objects which is characterized by k. The authors give not only conditions under which revealing information about the second object in advance benefits the seller, but also the optimal releasing amount of information in the market with two sellers and one seller, respectively.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Davis A M, Katok E, and Kwasnica A M, Should sellers prefer auctions? A laboratory comparison of auctions and sequential mechanisms, Management Science, 2014, 60(4): 990–1008.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Lai K K, Ma J, and Wang S Y, On managerial decision problem of the auction sites, Journal of System Science and Complexity, 2006, 19(3): 340–351.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Rao C J, Zhao Y, and Ma S H, Procurement decision making mechanism of divisible goods based on multi-attribute auction, Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 2012, 11(4): 397–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Rao C J and Zhao Y, Multi-stage sequential uniform price auction mechanism for divisible goods, Expert Systems with Applications, 2013, 40(15): 6105–6114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Haruvy E and Katok E, Increasing revenue by decreasing information in procurement auctions, Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(1): 19–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Colucci D, Doni N, and Valori V, Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation, Economics Letters, 2012, 117(3): 883–886.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Galor E, Galor M, and Dukes A, Optimal information revelation in procurement schemes, Rand Journal of Economics, 2007, 38(2): 400–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Sarne D, Alkoby S, and David E, On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions, Artificial Intelligence, 2014, 215: 24–54.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Milgrom P and Weber R J, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica, 1982, 50(5): 1089–1122.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Krishina V, Auction Theory, Academic Press, San Diego, 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Mares V and Harstad R M, Private information revelation in common-value auctions, Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 109(2): 264–282.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Szech N, Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47(4–5): 462–469.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Bonet M J and Pesendorfer M, Optimal sequential auctions, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2014, 33: 61–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Pitchik C, Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information, Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 66(2): 928–949.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Sfrensen S T, Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects, Economics Letters, 2006, 91(3): 337–342.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Jeitschko T D, Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply, Economics Letters, 1999, 64: 67–72.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Neugebauer T and Christou P P, Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with (out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2007, 63: 55–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Feng J and Chatterjee K, Simultaneous vs. sequential sales: Bidders competition and supply uncertainty, Decision Support Systems, 2010, 49: 251–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Weber R J, Multiple-Object Auctions, New York University Press, New York, 1983.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Automation, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China

    Erqin Hu & Yong Zhao

  2. School of Science, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan, 430068, China

    Erqin Hu

  3. School of Science, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, 430070, China

    Congjun Rao

Authors
  1. Erqin Hu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Yong Zhao
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Congjun Rao
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Erqin Hu.

Additional information

This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61273206 and 71471069.

This paper was recommended for publication by Editor ZHANG Xun.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Hu, E., Zhao, Y. & Rao, C. Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects. J Syst Sci Complex 29, 1617–1628 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-016-4315-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-016-4315-1

Keywords

Search

Navigation