Abstract
An acquisition discount can reflect not only the liquidity demands for unlisted targets but also the strategic requirements, management efficiencies and capital allocations for the listed bidders. Based on Officer (2007), the authors choose an acquisition approach to generate an acquisition discount for unlisted targets. In China, unlisted firms are sold at a deeper discount than listed firms. The deeper discount mainly depends on the liquidity demand and the characteristics of the bilateral trading components. Larger bidders tend to pay more, whereas smaller targets are sold at lower discounts. The values of unlisted targets in the TMT industry are underestimated. Furthermore, buying out unlisted targets can significantly increase the abnormal return of public bidders during the announcement period. Deeper discounts or stock payments have a positive effect on the stock values of the bidders, whereas this positive increase will be weakened if the bidder is large or has a previous ownership relationship.
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This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 71173213.
This paper was recommended for publication by Editor ZHANG Xun.
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Dong, J., Jiao, D. & Sun, X. Acquisition discount and valuation effect of private M&As in China. J Syst Sci Complex 30, 1364–1381 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-017-5274-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-017-5274-x