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Tight chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)-secure hybrid encryption scheme with full public verifiability

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new “full public verifiability” concept for hybrid public-key encryption schemes. We also present a new hybrid public-key encryption scheme that has this feature, which is based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. We have proven that the new hybrid public-key encryption scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model. The “full public verifiability” feature means that the new scheme has a shorter ciphertext and reduces the security requirements of the symmetric encryption scheme. Therefore, our new scheme does not need any message authentication code, even when the one-time symmetric encryption scheme is passive attacks secure. Compared with all existing publickey encryption schemes that are secure to the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, our new scheme has a shorter ciphertext, efficient tight security reduction, and fewer requirements (if the symmetric encryption scheme can resist passive attacks).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economic Information Engineering, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 611130, China

    Li Kang & JiaFen Liu

  2. Research Center for Payment Systems of China, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 610074, China

    Li Kang

  3. Information Security and National Computing Grid Lab, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, 610031, China

    XiaoHu Tang

Authors
  1. Li Kang
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  2. XiaoHu Tang
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  3. JiaFen Liu
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Correspondence to Li Kang.

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Kang, L., Tang, X. & Liu, J. Tight chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)-secure hybrid encryption scheme with full public verifiability. Sci. China Inf. Sci. 57, 1–14 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-014-5166-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-014-5166-9

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