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The Dilemma of Dual Use Biological Research: Polish Perspective

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Abstract

Biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security is termed dual use. In Poland there are adequate conditions for conducting experiments that could be qualified as dual use research, and therefore, a risk of attack on Poland or other countries exists. Optimal solutions for limiting such threats are required, and the national system of biosecurity should enable early, reliable, and complete identification of this type of research. Scientists should have a fundamental role in this process, their duty being to immediately, upon identification, report research with dual use potential. An important entity in the identification system of dual use research should also be the Central Register of Biological and Biomedical Research, which gathers information about all biological and biomedical research being conducted in a given country. Publishers, editors, and review committees of journals and other scientific publications should be involved in evaluating results of clinical trials. The National Council of Biosecurity should be the governmental institution responsible for developing a system of dual use research threat prevention. Its role would be to develop codes of conduct, form counsel of expertise, and monitor the problem at national level, while the Dual Use Research Committee would be responsible for individual cases. In Poland, current actions aiming to provide biological safety were based on developing and passing an act about genetically modified organisms (GMO’s) and creating a GMO Committee. Considering experiences of other nations, one should view these actions as fragmentary, and thus insufficient protection against dual use research threats.

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Notes

  1. The scientist is obliged to combat the improper use of scientific achievements in general, and their use against humankind in particular. The scientist should be aware that the results of his/her scientific activity can be wrongfully applied, but this should not dissuade him/her from engaging in purely cognitive work. The scientist is, however, obliged to counteract any attempt at putting science to what are from the humanist point of view undignified ends, by:

    • warning of the possible consequences of such attempts;

    • refusing to cooperate;

    • informing and mobilizing public opinion, and in particular that of the scientific community.

  2. Scientific research should be conducted in such a way as to not pose a threat to humankind or society, or affect the natural and cultural environment thereof.

  3. The scientist abides by the international principles and conventions on the shared responsibility of academics.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Internal Medicine and Endocrinology, Medical University of Warsaw, Banacha 1A, 02-097, Warsaw, Poland

    Marek Czarkowski

  2. Center of Bioethics of the Supreme Medical Council, Warsaw, Poland

    Marek Czarkowski

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  1. Marek Czarkowski
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Correspondence to Marek Czarkowski.

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Czarkowski, M. The Dilemma of Dual Use Biological Research: Polish Perspective. Sci Eng Ethics 16, 99–110 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-008-9078-1

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