Abstract
Against the ideal of value-free science I argue that science is not––and cannot be––value-free and that relevant values are both cognitive and moral. I develop an argument by indicating various aspects of the value-ladenness of science. The recognition of the value-ladenness of science requires rethinking our understanding of the rationality and responsibility of science. Its rationality cannot be seen as merely instrumental––as it was seen by the ideal of value-free science––for this would result in limiting the autonomy of science and reducing scientists to “minds to hire”. The scientific rationality must be seen as practical rationality which takes into account the full horizon of values. The scientific responsibility must also be broaden in scope and type. On this basis I draw three practical conclusions concerning the organization of research and training of young scientists, appealing to Plato’s claim that those most capable of healing are also those most capable of harming.
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Notes
A classical formulation of main theses constituting the ideal of value-free science can be found in Weber (1992). .
See, for example, Glass (1993). Some ideas can also be found in a booklet “Good Manner in Science. A Set of Principles and Practical Guidelines” prepared by the Committee for the Ethics in Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
Stevenson and Byerly (2000, p. 253).
For analysis of such cases see Root (1993).
Proctor (1991, p. 3).
See, for example, Longino (1990).
See, for example, Lacey (1999). Lacey explicitly states that in the case of any clash between scientific theses and theses justifying an accepted value-complex, either the value-complex must be abandoned or a different justification for it must be found.
See Kitcher (2001) .
See Lekka-Kowalik (2000).
The question of whether there might be cases of research that should never be undertaken obtains various answers. For example Nicholas Rescher claims that there are such pieces of knowledge with which we, people, are not sufficiently suited to cope, and therefore it would be imprudent and even immoral to search for such knowledge (see Rescher 1987). Peter Gärdenfors claims that there is no such knowledge (see Gärdenfors 1990). Deborah Johnson discusses the issue in (1999). However, this very question––as well as follow-up questions such as who should make deciding, and how decisions should be taken––can be posed only when we accept the idea that the fact that a research leads to knowledge by itself does not ultimately justify the decision to carry research on and that social consequences of acquiring knowledge matter in justification. And it is this idea that is important for showing that science is value-laden and that non-cognitive values-judgments constitute part of scientific practice. .
See Rudner (1953).
For a detailed discussion see Douglas (2000).
There seem to be a general agreement that we are witnessing a change in both an organizational and epistemic form of doing science. That new form is named Mode 2 (M. Gibbons, H. Novotny, P. Scott et al.), post-academic science (J. Ziman), the Triple Helix (H. Etzkowitz et. al), post-normal science (S. Funtovicz, J. Ravetz), grassroots science (T. Hansen), and some other. Some authors treat their ideas as a description of the development of science, some take them as prescription to steer the scientific development. I do not intend to enter into discussion on similarities and differences between various diagnosis of this change. One can find such a discussion and relevant literature for example in Hessels and van Lente (2008). What I want to stress is that this new form only makes the presence of non-cognitive value-judgments in scientific practice more visible, not that this presence is a consequence of the change of science's research paradigm.
For a detailed analysis of practical rationality see: Agazzi (2004).
See Jonas 1984.
Ziman (1998, p. 1814).
There of course arises the question of how decisions in such bodies should be taken. The answer to this question depends however on the view whether science is value-free or value-laden. .
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This paper is based on a communication I presented at the conference The Advancement of Science and the Dilemma od Dual Use: Why We Can’t Afford to Fail, Warsaw, Nov. 9–10, 2007.
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Lekka-Kowalik, A. Why Science cannot be Value-Free. Sci Eng Ethics 16, 33–41 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-009-9128-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-009-9128-3