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Nuclear Power is Neither Right Nor Wrong: The Case for a Tertium Datur in the Ethics of Technology

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Abstract

The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we propose, nuclear power is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, but rather right and wrong to some degree. We are aware that this non-binary analysis of nuclear power is controversial from a theoretical point of view. Utilitarians, Kantians, and other moral theorists make sharp, binary distinctions between right and wrong acts. However, an important argument speaking in favour of our non-binary analysis is that it better reflects our considered intuitions about the ethical trade-offs we face in discussions of nuclear power. The aim of this article is to make this argument sharp by explaining how it can be rendered compatible with, and supported by, the Capability Approach, which is quickly becoming one of the most influential frameworks for thinking about human development.

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Notes

  1. For an overview of some recent debates, see e.g. van de Poel (2011), Roeser (2011) and Taebi (2012).

  2. The traditional utilitarian criterion of rightness is binary because it stipulates that an act is right if and only if it brings about at least as much wellbeing (or whatever is intrinsically valuable) as every alternative act; all other acts are wrong. That said, utilitarians of course concede that the best option is the one that maximises utility and the second best option the one that produces the second-largest amount of wellbeing, etcetera. To say that an act is second best is, however, not equivalent to saying that it is right to some degree and wrong to some (other) degree. Utilitarianism is of particular interest in the case of energy supply as it provides the theoretical basis of many cost-benefit or risk analysis.

  3. See, for instance, Sen (1980, 1985, 1993, 1999) and Nussbaum (2001, 2004). The authors of this article have somewhat different attitudes to the Capability Approach. While Hillerbrand is largely in favor of it, Peterson believes that other accounts of wellbeing might fit better with our considered moral intuitions. It is nevertheless interesting to try to find out what the implications of this influential perspective on human wellbeing might be for the use of nuclear power.

  4. For extensive overview of the recent literature on this topic, see Roeser et al (2012).

  5. Although this paper is implicitly based on a consequentialist approach to ethics, the Capability Approach is compatible with both consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethics.

  6. Nussbaum (2001) seems to believe that the ten capabilities she lists are irreducible.

  7. Someone might argue that all three alternatives are wrong and that we are thus facing a moral dilemma. Our reply to this objection is that the second option, the new technology, seems to be so much better from a moral point of view than the other options, so if those options are wrong in the binary sense then the new technology cannot also be wrong in the binary sense. If necessary, the reader can simply adjust the numbers to trigger this intuition.

  8. The distinction between verdictive and evidential reasons was introduced by Foot in the 1950s. See Peterson (2013) for a recent discussion of this distinction, and see Espinoza and Peterson (2012) for a largely analogous discussion of degrees of rightness and stem cell ethics.

  9. Foot’s distinction is related to, but not equivalent to, Ross’s (1930) distinction between prima facie duties and one’s duty proper. A prima facie duty is a duty that is always in force, but which can be overridden by other duties. The duty proper is determined by balancing all prima facie duties against each other, and all prima facie duties are fully in force throughout the process. Evidential reasons are, of course, not fully in force throughout the process in which one’s verdictive reasons are determined.

  10. This argument is analogous to that outlined in Espinoza and Peterson (2012) and Peterson (2013).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Jaffalaan 5, 2628 BX, Delft, The Netherlands

    Rafaela Hillerbrand

  2. Section for Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Martin Peterson

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  1. Rafaela Hillerbrand
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  2. Martin Peterson
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Correspondence to Martin Peterson.

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Hillerbrand, R., Peterson, M. Nuclear Power is Neither Right Nor Wrong: The Case for a Tertium Datur in the Ethics of Technology. Sci Eng Ethics 20, 583–595 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9452-5

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