Abstract
The values that will govern choices among future energy systems are unlikely to be the same as the values we embrace today. This paper discusses principles of rational choice for agents expecting future value shifts. How do we ought to reason if we believe that some values are likely to change in the future? Are future values more, equally, or less important than present ones? To answer this question, I propose and discuss the Expected Center of Gravity Principle, which articulates what I believe to be a reasonable compromise between present and future values.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
There is a separate literature on preference change, in which past preferences are sometimes thought to matter. (See Strohmaier & Messerli 2022 for an overview.) Preferences are commonly defined as choice dispositions that are “revealed” in choices, whereas values are not always individual as they may depend on attitudes of larger groups (say, society as a whole), or may even be mind-independent (as some moral realists would have it). If past preferences matter, we could expect agents whose current preferences are identical to sometimes choose differently because of their past preferences.
For an overview of different accounts of value, see Schroeder (2008).
In physics, the center of gravity of an object is an imaginary point where the total weight can be thought to be concentrated in order to simplify calculations. In this paper I use the term “center of gravity” in a metaphorical sense.
The factual claims in this section are partly based on Teskeviciene and Harrison (2007).
The first reactor was closed in 2004 and the second in 2009.
Pancevski (2022).
For an introduction, see the classic textbook by Kruskal and Wish (1978).
Rawls (1971, p. 266).
References
De Wildt, T. E., Chappin, E. J. L., van de Kaa, G., Herder, P. M., & van de Poel, I. R. (2019). Conflicting values in the smart electricity grid a comprehensive overview. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 111, 184–196.
de Wildt, T. E., van de Poel, I. R., & Chappin, E. J. L. (2021). Tracing long-term value change in (energy) technologies: Opportunities of probabilistic topic models using large data sets. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 47, 429–458.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1955). Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy, 63, 309–321.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1983). Two distinctions in goodness. Philosophical Review, 92(2), 169–195.
Krantz, D., Luce, D., Suppes, P., & Tversky, A. (1971). Foundations of measurement: Additive and polynomial representations (Vol. 1). New York Academic Press.
Kruskal, J. B., & Wish, M. (1978). Multidimensional scaling. Sage Publications.
Melnyk, A. (2022). An interpretation of value change: A philosophical disquisition of climate change and energy transition debate. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 47, 404–428.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basic Books.
Pancevski, B. (2022). Germany to delay closure of two nuclear-power plants as energy crisis bites. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-to-delay-closure-of-two-nuclear-power-plants-as-energy-crisis-bites-11662400161
Peterson, M. (2017). The ethics of technology: A geometric analysis of five moral principles. Oxford University Press.
Pettigrew, R. (2020). Choosing for changing selves. Oxford University Press.
Rabinowicz, W., & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2000). A distinction in value: Intrinsic and for its own sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100(1), 33–51.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard University Press.
Schroeder, M. (2008). Value theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/value-theory/
Strohmaier. D., & Messrli, M. (2022). Preference change. (manuscript).
Teskeviciene, B., & Harrison, P. (2007). Problems in planning the early closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant. In Lessons learned from the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the safe termination of nuclear activities. Proceedings of an international conference. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety, Vienna.
van de Poel, I. (2021). Design for value change. Ethics and Information Technology, 23, 27–31.
van de Poel, I., & Taebi, B. (2022). Value change in energy systems. Science, Technology & Human Values, 47(3), 371–379.
Verkasalo, M., et al. (2009). European norms and equations for a two dimensional presentation of values as measured with Schwartz’s 21-item portrait values questionnaire. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(5), 780–792.
Wu, H., & Leung, S.-O. (2017). Can likert scales be treated as interval scales? —A simulation study. Journal of Social Service Research, 43(4), 527–532.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Peterson, M. Value Change, Energy Systems, and Rational Choice: The Expected Center of Gravity Principle. Sci Eng Ethics 29, 13 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-023-00436-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-023-00436-2