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A post-quantum end-to-end encryption over smart contract-based blockchain for defeating man-in-the-middle and interception attacks

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Abstract

Ethereum is a public, open-source, decentralized, and peer-to-peer blockchain-based computing network which is involving to the usefulness of smart contract. It gives a distributed Turing-complete virtual machine in which some codes can be executed by utilizing a worldwide and public network of nodes. The compelled certificate creation and Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks are two major attacks on End-to-End Encryption (EEE) and SSL/TLS. A portion of the real attacks on end-to-end encryption and SSL/TLS is IP/ARP poisoning and the phishing attack. MITM attack makes the client difficult to understand, whether they are associated with a unique verified and secured connection or not. Since the certificate and public-key that is being passed during the connection setup is unreliable and insecure, the attacker can undoubtedly change the data in the certificate and leaves the endorsement of the certificate and public-key to the client. The purpose of this paper is to present a solution of providing the legitimacy and authenticity of freely shared and published online digital data, e.g., digital certificates, cryptographic keys, and common reference strings such as shared passwords using a mix of recently developed innovations which primary include blockchain, smart contract, InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), and quantum-resistant Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol over rings and ideal lattices. Ethereum smart contract is utilized to manage, surveil, and give detectability and visibility into the history of digital data from its beginning to the most recent variant, in a way that it is decentralized and internationally accessed with high integrity, resiliency, and transparency, that we should thank to the immutability and irreversibility of the blockchain. The full code of our smart contract is given, with a discourse on the execution and testing of its key functionalities.

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Notes

  1. https://www.comodo.com

  2. https://www.godaddy.com

  3. https://www.certum.pl/pl

  4. https://keyserver.pgp.com/vkd/GetWelcomeScreen.event

  5. https://pgp.mit.edu

  6. https://ipfs.io/docs/install/

  7. http://getbootstrap.com/

  8. https://www.jetbrains.com/webstorm/

  9. https://metamask.io/

  10. http://remix.ethereum.org

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Correspondence to Amir Hassani Karbasi.

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Karbasi, A.H., Shahpasand, S. A post-quantum end-to-end encryption over smart contract-based blockchain for defeating man-in-the-middle and interception attacks. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 13, 1423–1441 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-020-00901-w

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