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Explanatory Correlates of Consciousness: Theoretical and Computational Challenges

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Abstract

Consciousness is a key feature of mammalian cognition and revealing its underlying mechanisms is one of the most important scientific challenges for the 21st century. In this article I review how computational and theoretical approaches can facilitate a transition from correlation to explanation in consciousness science. I describe progress towards identifying ‘explanatory correlates’ underlying four fundamental properties characterizing most if not all conscious experiences: (i) the co-existence of segregation and integration in conscious scenes, (ii) the emergence of a subjective first-person perspective, (iii) the presence of affective conscious contents, either transiently (emotion) or as a background (mood) and (iv) experiences of intention and agency that are characteristic of voluntary action. I also discuss how synthetic approaches can shed additional light on possible functions of consciousness, the role of embodiment in consciousness, and the plausibility of constructing a conscious artefact.

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Notes

  1. Autoscopy is the experience of seeing one’s own body in extrapersonal space, whereas an out-of-body experience is characterized by a shift in perspective to a location outside the body [55].

  2. Intriguingly, the thalamocortical pathway conveying detailed interoceptive signals to the right anterior insula appears to be unique to primates [17].

  3. As Haggard emphasizes, activity in preSMA is not to be interpreted as the origin of ‘free will’ in the sense of an uncaused cause. Brain circuits underlying volition likely consist of complex loops, and indeed input to preSMA from basal ganglia is thought to play an important role in the generation of voluntary action.

  4. Strictly speaking this is a description of ‘property emergence’. There is also the notion of ‘temporal emergence’ which refers to the appearance of a qualitatively new phenomenon over time.

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Acknowledgements

Preparation of this article was supported by EPSRC leadership fellowship EP/G007543/1. I am grateful to Tom Ziemke for useful comments on a first draft and to Owen Holland for Fig. 3b.

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    Anil Seth

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Seth, A. Explanatory Correlates of Consciousness: Theoretical and Computational Challenges. Cogn Comput 1, 50–63 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-009-9007-x

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