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Using Human–Computer Interfaces to Investigate ‘Mind-As-It-Could-Be’ from the First-Person Perspective

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Abstract

There is a growing community of researchers who are interested in establishing a science of the experiential or ‘lived’ aspects of the human mind. This shift from cognitive science to consciousness science presents a profound challenge to synthetic approaches. To be sure, symbolic artificial intelligence constituted the original foundation of cognitive science; subsequent progress in robotics has helped to pioneer a new understanding of the mind as essentially embodied, situated, and dynamical, while artificial life has informed the concept of biological self-organization. However, with regard to the development of a science of the experienced mind, the relevance of these synthetic approaches still remains uncertain. We propose to address the challenge of first-person experience by designing new human–computer interfaces, which aim to artificially mediate a participant’s sensorimotor loop such that novel kinds of experience can emerge for the user. The advantage of this synthetic approach is that computer interface technology enables us to systematically vary the ways in which participants experience the world and thereby allows us to systematically investigate ‘mind-as-it-could-be’ from the first-person perspective. We illustrate the basic principles of this method by drawing on examples from our research in sensory substitution, virtual reality, and interactive installation.

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Notes

  1. We are aware that all of these major stages in the history of cognitive science have various precursors in the history of the science of life and mind. In the interest of brevity we do not enter into a more comprehensive historical discussion here (but see, e.g., [3, 7–10]).

  2. The same is true of our biological understanding of life and mind. For instance, whereas cognitive science was originally more influenced by abstract computational models than by the results of actual neuroscience, nowadays neuroscience is clearly a much more prestigious area of research. Similarly, the biological foundations of the enactive approach started out as abstract organizational principles, but they are now being revised according to more realistic constraints [10]. Varela [62] referred to this general trend in cognitive science as a ‘re-enchantment of the concrete’.

  3. The name ‘artificial embodiment’ for this new method is not without ambiguity, especially because it does not explicitly highlight the fact that we are talking about a human-centered synthetic approach. However, for lack of a better phrase, we continue to use it here as a convenient shorthand to denote the method of studying mind-as-it-could-be by artificially varying a person’s embodiment via technological means.

  4. C. G. Langton, http://www.biota.org/papers/cglalife.html.

  5. The extended mind approach to cognitive science [81] probably entails a similar claim, but there are important differences in emphasis. Whereas the enactive account of lived experience assigns a constitutive role to the interactions between brain, body and (technology) world [79, 82], it seems that the extended mind approach is committed to restricting this account to the interactions within the brain alone [83]. Perhaps future research in artificial embodiment can help to resolve this theoretical difference.

  6. Interestingly, the potential role of cross-modal influences was only discovered during a second-person interview, where it turned out that the motor sounds of the vibro-tactile interface modulated the appearance of the perceptual space afforded by the device. The discovery of this unforeseen effect, which emerged without having been designed explicitly as a feature, highlights the need for a tight integration between the synthetic and analytic aspects of artificial embodiment in order to capture emergent effects.

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Acknowledgments

Froese’s research was financially supported by a Grant-in-Aid of the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science. We thank Yuki Sato for his help in the design of Fig. 2.

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  1. Ikegami Laboratory, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan

    Tom Froese & Takashi Ikegami

  2. Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

    Keisuke Suzuki

  3. Department of Electronics and Mechatronics, Tokyo Polytechnic University, Tokyo, Japan

    Yuta Ogai

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  1. Tom Froese
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Correspondence to Tom Froese.

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Froese, T., Suzuki, K., Ogai, Y. et al. Using Human–Computer Interfaces to Investigate ‘Mind-As-It-Could-Be’ from the First-Person Perspective. Cogn Comput 4, 365–382 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-012-9153-4

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