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Side channels as building blocks

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Abstract

Since the introduction of the first side-channel analyses in academia about 15 years ago, several physical attacks have been presented that exploit side-channel leakages to break implementations of cryptographic algorithms. This article deals with the same physical property of electronic devices, but focuses on the art of tailoring it for constructive uses. More precisely, two scenarios, i.e., hardware Trojans and IP watermarking, are illustrated in which the designer of an electronic circuit can add functionality by considering side channels as part of the available design space. Both applications use the same concept, i.e., deliberately leaking a secret through a side channel while keeping the introduced side channel hidden from adversaries and attackers. This article provides a broad overview of the existing works for both applications and should serve as a comprehensible introduction to the underlying field of research. This includes many subtle details that have not been discussed in literature yet, including existing shortcomings and possible improvements to the existing works. The solutions summarized in this article provide general guidelines for theorists and practitioners to use side channels constructively to achieve designs that are robust against detection and removal. Furthermore, we present an entirely new design of a Trojan side-channel. This architecture demonstrates the potential of a Trojan side-channel that is neatly tailored to the targeted implementation. The new design removes all non-invasive starting points a third party could use to analyze or get access to the secret-channel.

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Notes

  1. Constant leakage here means that the leakage provided by the TSC does not depend on the intermediate state of the device and does not change as long as the secret key is fixed.

  2. Since the selected intermediate state and the combination function are kept obscure, the third party needs to guess them and examine the existence of a TSC module for each guess.

  3. This is a property that is considered for the encoding mechanism \(e(K)\) and does not deal with the encryption scheme realized by the target device.

  4. Note that depending on the LC, it might be necessary to consider a mapping of the used code with respect to a suitable power model of the LC prior to correlation-based demodulation.

  5. Its HDL specification was obtained from the official website of the corresponding author.

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Acknowledgments

The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the European Commission through the ICT program under contract ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II and by the NSF Grant 0916854.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Markus Kasper, Amir Moradi, Oliver Mischke, Tim Güneysu & Christof Paar

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA

    Georg T. Becker, Christof Paar & Wayne Burleson

Authors
  1. Markus Kasper
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  2. Amir Moradi
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  3. Georg T. Becker
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  4. Oliver Mischke
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  5. Tim Güneysu
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  6. Christof Paar
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  7. Wayne Burleson
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Correspondence to Amir Moradi.

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Kasper, M., Moradi, A., Becker, G.T. et al. Side channels as building blocks. J Cryptogr Eng 2, 143–159 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-012-0040-4

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