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Low-cost distance-spoofing attack on FMCW radar and its feasibility study on countermeasure

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a low-cost distance-spoofing attack on a millimeter-wave frequency-modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar. It uses only a replica radar chipset and a single compact microcontroller board in mass production. No expensive and bulky test instrument is required; hence, a low-cost and lightweight attack setup is developed. Despite the limited hardware resources used in this setup, the replica radar can be precisely synchronized with the target radar for distance spoofing. A half-chirp modulation scheme enables timing compensation between crystal oscillators on the replica and the target radar boards. A two-step delay insertion scheme precisely controls the relative delay difference between two radars at nanosecond order; consequently, the attacker can manipulate the distance measured at the target radar with only a \(\pm \,10\) m ranging error. Moreover, the feasibility of spoofing attacks on a conventional countermeasure employing random-chirp modulation is discussed. Simulation-based experiments reveal that the attack occurs successfully by estimating the random chirp pattern. This demonstrates the potential feasibility of low-cost malicious attacks on commercial FMCW radar as a physical security threat.

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Acknowledgements

This paper is partially based on results obtained from a project, JPNP16007, commissioned by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO).

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Correspondence to Shoei Nashimoto.

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Nashimoto, S., Suzuki, D., Miura, N. et al. Low-cost distance-spoofing attack on FMCW radar and its feasibility study on countermeasure. J Cryptogr Eng 11, 289–298 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-020-00252-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-020-00252-5

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