Abstract.
We identify, in a continuous multidimensional framework, a maximal domain of preferences compatible with strategy-proofness for a given generalized median voter scheme. It turns out that these domains are a variation of single-peakedness. A similar but stronger result for the discrete case and single-peakedness has been already obtained by Barberà et al. (1999). However, both results are independent and their proofs involve different arguments.
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Received: 27 July 1998/Accepted: 11 September 2000
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Berga, D. Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 175–192 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8331-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8331-1